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Abstract
In this contribution a new decomposition approach for block-angular pro-
gramming problems is presented. Historically, decomposition methods are
either price or reaource directive. The present paper integrates the two
in the sense that part of the common conatraints are coordinated by pri-
ces, while, at the same time, the other part of the common constraints
are coordinated by dírect allocationa. We find increasing lower and de-
creasing upper bounds for the optimal value and globally feseible solu-
tions with improving value can easily be obtained.
The resulting algorithm has an appealing economíc interpretation in
terms of mixed price-budget oriented planning in a two-level organiza-
tion.
1) The author ia grateful to Prof. Dr. J.F. Benders for many fruitful
discussions and useful suggestions. The idea for the convergence proof
is mainly due to J.P. Boly and C.P.M. van Hoesel.
The research is supported by a grant frmn the Common Reaearch Pool of
the Tilburg University and the Technical University Eindhoven ( Samenwer-
kingsorgaan KHT-THE) in the Netherlands.i
Horizontal mixed decomposition
1. Introduction
Alock-angular T.P problems can be decomposed in various ways.
Both problem and solutlon method often have an economic interpretation
in terms of a multilevel organization. Therefore classifications of de-
composition algorithms are frequently based on the .distinctíon "price-
directive" versus "resource-directive". This paper containe a hybrid
algorithm in the sense that the pricing operations and resource alloca-
tion operations occur simultaneously. Following Obel (1978), who has
introduced this mixed approach, we wíll epeak of "horizontal mixed de-
composítion". The present method is essentially an extension to the
theory because we explicitly analyse the master problem. Similar ideae,
with emphasis on the economic implications, have been found in a working
paper by Atkins (1979).
After the introduction of the problem (aection 2), it is refor-
mulated (section 3) and then replaced by two approximating formulations
(section 4) so that an iterative two-level solution strategq can be ap-
plied (section 5). Realization of near-optimal solution values by glo-
bally feasible solutions is then discussed (section 6) followed by the
economic interpretation of the algorithm (section 7).2
2. Problem formulation
The class of problems to be analysed is of the form
Maximize clxl -E '.. f cnxn
s.t. Alxl f.., f Anxn C a (~)
Alxl t... f Bnxn C b (,t~t)
D x C d
n n n
xl,..., xn ~ 0
Here: a, b, cj, d~ (j~l,...,n) are known vectors,
A~, B~, D3 (~j31,...,n) are known matrices,
x~ (j~l,...,n) are variable vectors,
all of appropriate dimensions.
It is well known that problem (2.1) can be viewed as a model of
a divisionalized organization (Dírickx and Jennergren (1979, chapter 6).
The common constraints (~) en (~~) express the common use of certain
resources by all divisions. In this paper we will develop a two-level
solution algorithm in which the common resources (~) are coordinated by
prices while the common resources (~~) are coordinated by allocations.
This treatment of the common constrainte (~) and (~~) will be referred
to as horizontal mixed decompositíon.
Before we present our algorithm, a few asaumptiona and defini-
tions are in order.
We presume the exiatence of a feseible solution of problem (2.1). The3
dívisional feasible regiona X~, which are defined se X~:-
{xj ~ D~x~ G dj, x~ ~ 0}are assumed to be bounded. So (2.1) has a finite
optimum.
For j- 1,...,n, the aet Y~ is defined as followa:
Y~ E Y~ : -{x~ I xj E X~, B~x~ G Y~} f~ (2.2)
Set Yj will be called the set of feasible allocationa for diviaion j
concerning common resourcea (~~).
For notational convenience, the aet Y is introduced:
n
Y:~ {(yl,...,yn) ~ E yj G b; y~ E Y~, j- 1,..., n} (2.3)
j~l
Set Y will be called the set of globally feasible allocationa concerning
common resources (~~).
3. Reformulation of the original problem
We define the Lagrangian function relative to the common con-
strainta (~):
n n
L(x,n):a E c x f n(a- E A x)
~~1 ~ ~ ~el j j




s.t. x~ E X~, j~ 1,...,n, E B~xj G b
j-1
Optimal solutions (x, n) to the minmax problem (3.1) are saddle points
of L(x, n). The next theorem provides for necessary and eufficient con-
dítions for the existence of a saddle point.
Theorem 1:
A vector x-( x,..., xn) is a solution to the LP problem (2.1) if and
only if there exists a vector n ~ 0 such that (x, n) is a saddle point
of L(x,n).
Proof: see Appendix A.
Now the usefulness of a saddle point le evident: if (x, n) is a saddle
point of L(x,n), then x solves the original problem (2.1).
If we use the set Y(see formula (2.3)) and introduce the func-
tions ~~(y~,n) defined as
~j(yj,n):- Max{(c~-nA~)x~ ~ x~ E X~, Bjxj t y~},
j a 1,...,n, problem ( 3.1) can be rewritten as
n
Min Max E ~3(y~,n) ~- na
n~0 yEY j~l
(3.2)
Problem (3.1) and (3.2) are equivalent because, for every n~ 0, the
inner maximization problema are equivalent ( see Laedon (1970, p. 462)).5
The functions ~~(y~,n) are concave in yj and convax in n. Moreover, they
are even piecewiae línear in both yj and a.
Due the the presvmed existence of a finite optimum to (2.1), the origi-
nal Lagrangian L(x,a) has a saddle poínt. So the functíon
n
E~j(y~,n) i- na has a saddle point, too. Aence, it is allowed to re-
j:l
verse the order of maximization and minimization ín (3.2) (see Zangwill
(1969, p. 45-46), thereby obtaining:
n
Max Min E ~~(yj,n) f na
yEY n~0 jal
n
Min v s.t. v ~ E~~(Y~,n) f na, y E Y
a~p jal
In [he sequel, (3.2) will be referred to as (D), the dual problem, and
(3.3) as (P), the primal problem. The problem (P) and (D) have the same
optimal solutions. Equivalent formulations of (P) and (D) are
n








In this section, tangential approximation is applied to derive
appropriate relaxed versions of (P) and (D).6
Suppose we have at hand r tuples
(nk,yl,...,yn), k~ 1,...,r of
trial prices and allocations with respect to the common resources (~)
and (~~), respectively. Let nk ~ 0, y~ E Y~, j ~ 1,..., n, and
n
E yk ~ b for all k.
j~ 1 ~ n
From w C E~~(y~,n) t na, n~ 0, it follows that
j-1
n




v~ E ~~(y~,n) t na, k - 1,...,r
j~l
(4.2)
The r right-hand sides of (4.1) are not easily handled so we apply a
further relaxation. Tangential approximations are readily obtained by
solving the subproblems
Maxímize (cj-nkA~)x~
s.t. a~ xJ ~ Y~
For let x~ be an optimal solution, let u~ be an optimal dual solution
associated to the constraint g~x~ ~ y~~ while the optimal solution value
is ~~(y~, nk), by definition. Then it is a trivial task to ehow that
mj(Y~.nk) c~j(Yj.nk) f uj(Y~-Yj).
Y~ E Yj
(4.3)
(See Geoffrion (1970, p. 381) or Dirickx and Jennergren (1979, p. 69).7
The right-hand sidea of (4.2) can also be approximated
n
na f E ~~(Y~.n) ~ fk f(n-nk) Aa
j-1
where (k a 1,..., r):
n n
fk:~ E m(yk,nk) t nka ~ E (c -trkA )xk f nka
~-1 ~ ~ ~~1 ~ ~ j
n





Combining (3.6), (4.1) and (4.3) leads to the following relaxed
primal problem:
Max w




From (3.7), (4.2) and (4.4), we derive the following relaxed dual pro-
blem:
Min v
s.t. v~ fk f(n-nk) ~á , k~ 1,..., r (4.7)
n ~ 08
We conclude this section with a useful statement concerning the
optimal solution values of (4.6) and (4.7).
Let wp be the optimal solution value of (3.4), let vD be the optimal
solution value of (3.5). We know that wD ~ vP. Now, íf vr and wr are the
optimal solution valuea of (4.5) and (4.6), respectively, it holds that
vr t vD ~ wP G wr (4.8)
So the optimal solution value of the original problem líes between vr
and wr.
5. Solution strategy
Our algorithm approximates the solutíon of (P) and (D) by sol-
ving relaxed versions of (P) and (D), and adding new constraints to the
relaxated problems when necessary.
Let e~ 0 be the desired accuracy. Suppose one has arríved at a
relaxed primal and a relaxed dual problem of the form (4.5) and (4.6),
respectívely, each with r constrainta. We call these problems (Pr) and
(Dr). Solve (Pr) and denote the optimal solution and objective function
value b ~1 ~1 Y. n~l and v are the optimal y(yl '"''yn ) and wr. Similarl r
solution and objective function value to (Dr).
If wr - vr ~ e, we may terminate. Now we can generate a globally fea-
sible solution with value ~ vr (see section 6).
Otherwise, if wr - vr ~ e, solve the following subproblems:9
Max (cj-n~lA~)x~
s.t. B~ x~ c yj 1
x~ E Xj
This yields x~1~ u~rtl~ ~j(y~ 1~ nr~l)~ j~ 1,...,n, from which appro-
priate constraints to be added to (Pr) and (Dr), can be deduced. The
augmented problema are called (P~1) and (D~1).
If we solve (P~1) and (D~1), w~l and v~l will come out. These are,
possibly better, upper~lower bounds for the optimal objective function
value of the original problem as
~r c ~r-F 1 c ~T1 a wP c wrF.l c wr
Now it is clear that, by succeseively solving (Pr) and (Dr) and
adding new constraints to them, we expect to fínd shrinking intervals
[vr, wr], r~ 1,2,..., which contain the optimal objective function
value. Indeed, the dífference between vr and wr converges to zero. A
convergence proof is given in Appendix C.
The algorithm can be summarized as follows:
Summary of algorithm:
n
Step 0. Choose nl ~ 0, and y~ E Y~, j~l,...,n, such that E yj c b.
j-1
Set r:- 0.
Step 1. For j z 1,...,n, solve (5.1), which yields x~1~ u~ 1 and
~j(yj 1, n~l).10
Step 2. Compute f~l and Dá 1, and add appropriate constraints to (Pr)
and (Dr) thereby obtaining ( P~1) and (Dr,f,l), respectively.
Step 3. Set r:~ r f 1 and solve (Pr) and (Dr) which yields wr, vr,
rfl rFl rtl yl ,...,yn , n .
Step 4. Optimality test:
if wr - vr ~ e then terminate, otherwise return to step 1.
Up till now, we have treated the set Y as if it is completely
known. In practical applications it is usually impossible to obtain the
set Y(or the sets Y1,...,Yn) in explicit form. The literature, in par-
ticular Geoffrion (1970, section 3.1), offers several useful methoda to
generate the sets Y1,...,Yn during the iterations of the juet described
algorithm. Especially in the present, linear case, each Y~ can be speci-
fied without approximation by a finite collection of linear equalities.
Each of these inequalities can be added to (4.6) "when needed".
This aspect even more stresses the importance of the algorithm as an
information collecting procedure.
6. Generation of globally feasible solutions
So far, we have described a procedure which simultaneously gene-
rates a decreasing sequence of upper bounds as well as an increasíng
sequence of lower bounds for the optimal solution value. Moreover, both
sequences, i.e. (~r)1~ and ( wr)1, converge to this value. In this aec-11
tion, we will show that, without much extra effort, a globally feasible
solution can be computed.
The relaxed dual Dr is simply an LP problem and can be written
as
Minimize v







s.t. E ak 1
k-1




which i s equivalent to (recall (4.5)):




E ak E A~ xj ~ a
ksl jzl
ak i n12
Now let (ál,..., ár) be an optimal solution to (6.1). Its solution value
is equal to vr, the optimal value of Dr. If we define
r
k "k x E ~ x, j ~ 1,..., n
~.3 k31 3
(6.2)
then (X1~,,,~ Xn) is feasible to (2.1), due to the convexity properties,
and it has solution value vr.
Summarizing, we can derive a globally feasible solution by a
convex combination of previously generated divisional solutions. The
weighting factors are exactly the optimal dual variables associated to
pr, and the solution value is equal to the optimal value of Dr.
An alternative way to generate a globally feasible solution,
with value ~ vr proceeds as follows. Compute (j-1,..., n)
r r
ar - E ák A xk, br :~ E ák yk
~ . k31 ~ ~ j km 1 ~
where (al,..., ar) is again an optimal dual solution to (Dr).
for each j ~ 1,...,n the problem
Maximize c~x~
-r
s.t. A~x~ c a~
r
B~x~ c bj
Because X(as defined by formula (6.2)) is feasible
~
mal value of (6.4) is at least c~ Xj, Hence
values of each of the problems ( 6.4) ie at least
(6.4)
to (6.4), the opti-







As noted before, the original problem (2.1) can be viewed as a
model for a divisíonalized organization. The blocks D~x~ c d~, xj ~ 0
(jal,...,n) are associated with divisions and the common constraints (~)
and (~~) reflect the interdependencies (e.g. allocation of common re-
sources) between them. Furthermore, we pres~mme that there is a central
unit at the top level of the organization, that is aware of these inter-
dependencies but does not have complete information on the divisional
constraints. Identifying the objective functíon of (2.1) with the goal
of the firm, to be atrived after by the central unít, we observe that
the central unit cannot immediately realize that goal due to the lack of
knowledge on divisions. Instead, a planning procedure by which top-
management gathers information, must be applied. Aelow we describe such
a procedure. It is based on the decomposition algorithm as outlined in
the previous sections.
The essential feature of the method ís that
- the (~) interdependencies are coordinated by prícea, while
- the (~~) interdependencies are coordinated by direct allocations cq.
budgets.
Hence, we provide for a mixed price-budget directive planning procedure.
For explanatory purposes, we will assume that the (~) and (~~)
interdependencies are due to the common uae of certain resources by all
divisions. The goal of the firm is assumed to be profit maximizatlon.
The planning procedure is formed by a number of planning ses-
sions. At the start of a new planning session, the central unit aends a
price nr for the (~) resourcea and allocations ( or budgets)
yl' "''yn14
for the (~~) resources to the divisions. These are asked to compute
their maximum profit ~j(yj, nr), the required amount Aj xj of (~) re-
sources under the price nr and a marginal valuation u~ of the budget
y~ for ( ~~) resources ( j 3 1,...,n).
Formally, each division solves ita problem






and reports the maximum objective functíon value ~j(y~~nr)~ the optimal
dual variable u~ with respect to the constraint gj xj c y~ and the quan-
títy Aj x~, where x~ is the optimal solution to (7.1).
Based on the divisional responses, and information gathered in
previous sections, the central unit can derive a lower bound vr and an
upper bound wr for the maximum attainable profit ( i.e. the optímal value
of the original problem (2.1)).
The maximum attainable profit lies between theae bounda, so the central
unit can terminate the procedure as soon as their difference haa become
small enough. The central unit finds a partitioning of the (~) and (~~)
resouces under which the divisions together will at least realize a pro-
fit of vr, if the previous claims for ( ~) resourcea, i .e. Aj xj,
k- 1 r and the revious bud ets for k ,..., , p g ( ~~) resources, i.e. yj~
k~ 1,..., r, are adequately weighted. Weighting factors with this pro-
perty, which apply to both types of reaourcea and are uniform over the
divisions, can be obtaíned by a alight modification of the computational
procedure for vr. Formally, let ál,..., ár be these weighting factora.
Now the central unit must compute (j e 1,...,n)15
r r
ar :- S ák A xk, br :~ E ák yk .
~ k-1 ~ ~ ~ k~ 1 ~
If each divisíon optimally uses these final amounts of common resources,
it solves the problem
Maximize c~x~
s.t. Ajxj ~ aj
Bjx~ ~ b~
The sum of the divisional profits will be at least vr.
On the other hand, if the central unít is not satisfied with the
bounds vr and wr, i t can update the prices and allocations leading to
new bounds v~l and w~l. It will hold that
~r ~ ~rfl ~ OPT ~ wrtl ~ wr
where OPT denotes the maximum attainable profit. So the more information
the central unit gathers, the better it approximates the maximum attain-
able profit.
Now we will pay some attention to the way the central unit de-
rives the prices, budgets and profit estimates. As a matter of fact, the
prices nr and the lower bounds vr on the one hand, and the allocations
yr~.~.~ yr and the upper bounde wr on the other hand follow from two
1 n
separate computations. Firstly, we will consider the pricea nr together
with the lower bounds vr-16
Suppose we are at the end of the r-th planning sesaíon. So the
central unit has at hand the divisional responses of aession 1,2,..., r.
From the divisional responses of each session aeparately, the central
unit can form a linear function which approximatea the profit as func-
tion of the internal prices n. Hence, combining the divisional informa-
tion as collected in all previous sessions up till now, the central unit
derives a piecewise linear approximation of the profit function with
respect to changes in the prices for (~) resources. The collected infor-
mation is used in a"pessimistic" way, aince the approximating profit
function lies "belo~' the correct profit functlon. As a result, the es-
timated profit vr is a lower bound for the actual maximum attainable
profit. In the course of the procedure, the piecewiae linear approxima-
ting function becomes better and better, hence giving rice to improved
lower bounds v~l, ~ etc. ri- 2
The determination of subsequent wr and yi,.,,, yn proceeds in a
símilar way. The only difference is that here the central unit works
with an improving piecewise linear approximatíon for the profit function
with respect to changes in the allocations for (~~) resources, which
always lies above the correct profit function. Hence a decreasing sequ-
ence of upper bounds wr is the result.
8. Conclusion
Our maín purpose has been to derive a two-level decompoaítion
method with prices for some resources and allocationa for other resour-
ces occurring simultaneously. Furthermore, we were particularly interea-
ted in the computation of the prices and budgets. As a matter of fact,17
this computation provided for an upper and lower bound for the optimal
value of the problem at hand. Moreover, the lower bound, which increases
during the iteration sequence, ie directly asaociated to a globally fea-
sible solution. In other words, during the iterationa globally feasible
solutions can be obtained with increasing solution value.
The author is aware that, from a computational point of view,
several improvíng modifications could be incorporated. However, the con-
tribution of the present paper is that it provides for the correct ma-
thematical foundation of mixed coordination by pricea and budgeta in a
general two-level organization. Each of the subproblems, at the top le-
vel as well as at the divisional level, has a clear appealing economic
interpretation in terms of a planning procedure. Secondly, the mixed uae
of prices and budgets is a most realiatic option when comparing the pre-
sent planning procedure with planning in real-world organizations (e.g.
see Atkins (1973), Obel (1981)).lA
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Appendix A. Proof theorem 1
Consider the problem
Maximize px




with optimal solution x, Due to duality theory for LP, there exist u~
~ that solve the dual problem i.e.
Minimize ua f vb
s.t. uA t vB ~ p
u,v ~ (1
(A2)
Furthermore, it holds that u(Ax-a) s 0 and x is an optimal solution to
Maximize (p-uA)x
s.t. B x C b
x ~ 0
Now define:
L(x,u):- px - u(Ax-a) , Bx C b, x ~ 0, u~ 0.
Then: ( x~u) is a saddle point of L(x,u).
(A3)
Hence, we must prove that20
L(x,u) c L(x,u) c L(x,u)
for all x with Bx C b, x~ 0, all u~ 0.
As x solves (A3), we have (p-uA)x c( p-uA)x, so L(x,u) c L(x,u).
Secondly, u(~-a) a 0 whereas -u(Ax-a) ~ 0, so L(x,u) t L(x,u).
Summarizing, we have ehown that if (A1) has an optimal solution x~ then
there exist an u ~ 0 such that (x~u) is a saddlepoint of L(x,u).
Reversely, if L(x,u) has a saddlepoint (x,u) then x solves the
original problem (A1). This statement is even true for convex program-
ming problems, see Lasdon (1970, p. R5).
Appendix B. Further relaxation of problem (4.2)
We will show that for each k~ 1,..., r the following inequality
holds:
~~(Y~,n) ~ ~~(Y~,nk) f (nk-n)
A~x~
with (obviously) equality for n- ak.
Recall the definition of ~~(y~,n) (section 4).
For all xj satisfying B~xj C y~ , xj E Xj, it holds that
(B1)
~~(y~,n) ~ (c~-nkA~)x~ f (nk-n)A~xjzi
In particular
mj(Yj,n) ~ (c~-nkA~)x~ f (nk-n)A~x~
which is equivalent to
~j(Y~.n) ~ ~j(Y~,nk) f (nk-a)Ajxj .
Now that we have proved (B1), it easily followe that




E~~(Y~.n) f na ~ fk t( n-nk)Aa
j-1
n n
where fk: E~~(Y~,nk) f nka, Aá:e a- E A~x~ ,
~-1 j-I
(B2) is exactly inequality (4.4).
(B2)
Appendix C. A convergence proof for the algorithm as presented in sec-
tion 5
In this appendix we wíll prove convergence of the algorithm as
presented in section S. Two more assumptíons are required. After the
proof, a sufficient condition for one of them is given.22
Theorem:
if we assume that
1. the sequence (nr)1, is bounded,
2. the u~ are uniformly bounded (i.e. 0 t uj G M),
then the algorithm of section 5 converges in the aense that
wr - vr i p, r-~ W.
Proof:
We already know that vr C vr}I C vn - wP G wr}1 c wr. In the sequel we
will prove that wr - vr i 0 on a subset of indicea. Of course, this im-
plies that
lim vr - vD - wP - lim wr.
r-.m r-.~
The reasoning proceeds as follows.
The sequence (nr,Yl'
"''yn)1
converges on a subset of indices, as the
nr and all yr come from bounded sets. (The boundednesa of Y follows from
~ n
the compactness of each X~ and the global restriction E y~ c b.) The
j-1
convergent sub-sequences are denoted by
r ~ r m
(n s) and íY s) . j - 1,..., n.
sal ~ snl
As v ~ frs } (~rsfl-rrs)Ars
r~l a
and w c frs ~- E ujs(yjsfl-Yjs).
r~l ~sl
we have23
0 t w - ~ t(nrsfl-nrs)Ors f E ujs(y~r~l - y~s)
rsfl rstl a j-1
For s i m, the right-hand side of this expression converges to 0 as
„r r
Das and u~s are bounded. (The boundedneas of ~as ia simply due to the
boundedness of the sets X~, j- 1,..., n.) Hence
v - w ~ 0 , r r s s
s a m
and the proof is completed.
Now we present a sufficient condition for assumption 1 in the
theorem.
Suppose that there exists a known, feasible solution X1~,,,~ Xn such
n
that E A~ x~ ~ a. The knowledge of this "interior point" can be used
j-1
as follows.
From (3.1) it is clear that
vD ~ min L(x,n) for every fixed feasible x
n~0
As a consequence, we are allowed to add the constraint v~ L(x,a) to Dr,
r~ 1,2... Each Dr remains to be a relaxed dual problem.
With respect to the algorithm, we suppose that, upon initialitation, Dr
with r s 0 has only one constraint, viz.
n n
V i E C X f n(a - E A X)
~~1 j j ~~1 ~ j
which will be maintained throughout the subsequent iterations. An imme-
diate consequence of this modification is that the sequence (nr)m
124
n
will be bounded. To prove this, define: P:~ E c~ x~ ; ni:a the i-th
j-1
n
component of nr; ~i :~ the i-th component of a- E A~ x.
Now we have:
0 c n~l pi G E n~l 41 G vr - P C vn - P
i
r~l so N C ni G(vnP)Ii01), as Ai ~ 0
In other words, all future ni are bounded.i
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